Projectiles struck the crude tankers Al Bahyah and Mombasa B while both vessels were transiting the Strait of Hormuz [E1]. One seafarer was killed and several others were injured, turning the argument over passage into a body count [E1]. Verifiable daily transit counts remained roughly 34–45 vessels, far below the peacetime norm of about 130 [E8]. Ships are still moving, but every crossing now carries evidence of a corridor under sustained coercive pressure [E1][E8].
CENTCOM said it completed its latest wave of strikes on Iranian targets on 14 July [E2]. The command also said escorted merchant traffic continued through the waterway [E2]. Washington is therefore using direct strikes and naval protection to keep a reduced flow alive [E2][E8]. The result is a contested passage sustained by military force, with commercial movement continuing inside the fight [E1][E2][E8].
The president abandoned the proposed 20% transit fee and said Washington would pursue trade and investment deals with Gulf states [E3]. No public US legal instrument imposing the charge had appeared by 14 July [E3][E6]. The reversal stripped the proposal of any claim to an operating rule while preserving its power to frighten shippers and traders [E3][E7]. A fee announced through rhetoric and replaced through bargaining functioned as leverage without administrative machinery [E3][E6].
Charging for passage through an international strait has no legal basis, the International Maritime Organization said [E4]. Hapag-Lloyd called the proposed cargo fee “fundamentally wrong,” putting a major carrier directly against Washington’s proposal [E5]. A June US–Gulf Cooperation Council statement had already rejected tolls, fees and attempts to assert control over the strait [E6]. The chronology is blunt: Washington rejected the mechanism with Gulf partners, floated it anyway, then withdrew it when the shock arrived [E3][E6].
The counter-case is substantial. This is not a formal legal closure and not a lawful toll: ships still pass, no implementing instrument has been published, and Washington’s June position rejected such fees [E3][E6][E8]. Reduced traffic can reflect war-risk decisions by owners and crews as much as any command issued by a state [E1][E8]. The label “closed” erases vessels still crossing, and the label “open” erases the dead seafarer and the escorts keeping passage alive [E1][E2][E8].
Oil climbed to a one-month high as the United States and Iran stepped up attacks around Hormuz [E7]. Brent traded near $85 after reaching $87.55 intraday [E7]. Prices then retraced, showing that traders treated the danger as severe without pricing a permanent stoppage [E7]. The market’s path matched the physical record: live attacks, constrained passage and no posted fee regime [E1][E3][E7][E8].
Washington and Tehran have escalated around the lane while CENTCOM keeps selected merchant traffic moving under escort [E2][E7]. Carriers have treated the fee as illegitimate, while crews have had to treat the projectile threat as operational reality [E1][E5]. That is the improvised regime now governing Hormuz: force, escort, threat and bargaining without a posted rule [E1][E2][E3]. The fee vanished before the fires did [E1][E3].