Beijing's coast-guard patrol east of Taiwan entered its second month on 4 July when the Xiushan task group replaced Daishan. Taipei tracked two cutters 54 nautical miles off Hualien and hardened its institutional response, while Washington has not objected since a 24 June cable-protection statement.
BY THE ESCALATION DESK · Sprockett~ 3 MIN · RECORD E1-E10
CCG 2305 Xiushan and CCG 1401 Chongming tracked 54 nautical miles east of Hualien on 4 July, outside Taiwan's restricted-waters line · Map: Sprockett, Escalation Desk · Terrain: NOAA ETOPO1
China's coast-guard presence east of Taiwan completed its first full rotation on 4 July when the Xiushan task group replaced the Daishan group after thirty-four days of continuous patrol [E1][E2]. Beijing announced on 1 June that Daishan would conduct “law-enforcement patrols” in waters east of Taiwan [E1]. On 4 July the China Coast Guard credited the outgoing unit with a month of patrol, vessel-verification, fishery-protection and rescue work since June [E2]. Coverage of the handoff described a deliberate continuation despite international pushback [E9].
Taiwan's coast guard had monitored Chinese public vessels operating outside restricted waters near Lanyu since the patrol began [E3]. On the morning of 4 July it tracked CCG 2305 Xiushan and CCG 1401 Chongming fifty-four nautical miles east of Hualien harbor, roughly twenty-seven nautical miles beyond Taiwan's restricted-waters line [E7]. Taipei dispatched the cutters Pali and Hualien to shadow the pair [E7]. Those positions place the patrol in waters Taiwan does not enforce as sovereign territory, a detail Beijing cites when it describes the mission as routine law enforcement [E2].
On 9 June Chinese public vessels radioed three merchant ships, demanding origin and destination [E4]. Taiwan's coast guard broadcast that vessels need not heed the demands [E4]. No boarding has been documented east of Taiwan [E4]. The gap between radio hail and boarding marks the current ceiling on an escalation ladder; the next rung is the signal to watch.
Taipei's institutional response hardened in parallel with the rotation. On 4 July the Mainland Affairs Council said Beijing has no sovereignty, no related rights, no jurisdiction and no law-enforcement power in waters east of Taiwan [E5]. Earlier, Taipei told merchant ships they should ignore boarding requests from the Chinese coast guard and report them instead [E10]. Beijing calls the patrol lawful fishery protection; Taipei treats every enforcement act as a sovereignty challenge [E2][E5].
Hualien and Su'ao shelter Taiwan's fleet in wartime, and submarine cables that carry much of the island's internet traffic land on the east coast. A normalized Chinese constabulary presence on that Pacific flank would convert a sanctuary into a contested zone without a shot fired. That geography explains why Taipei escalated rhetoric even as the ships remained outside restricted waters [E5][E7]. Patrol persistence matters more than any single day's position fix.
Beijing has claimed the June operation “inspected 198 passing vessels,” a figure that comes from Chinese official framing and lacks independent confirmation [E2]. Taiwan's record supports only the three radio hails on 9 June [E4]. Each side attributes the other's characterization to political motive while insisting its own posture is defensive [E2][E5]. The gap between 198 and three is itself part of the grey-zone contest over what counts as enforcement.
Washington objected once, on 24 June, when a US statement carried by Taiwan's foreign ministry rejected Chinese interference with navigation, overflight and the freedom to lay undersea cables in waters east of Taiwan [E6]. No comparable statement followed the 4 July crew rotation [E2][E9]. Allied silence through the swap is part of the story Taipei must read when it assesses external backing for its east-flank posture [E5][E9].
National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu said Taiwan tracked a record 110-plus People's Liberation Army Navy and coast-guard vessels across the First Island Chain [E8]. That count situates the eastern patrol inside a wider surge rather than an isolated sortie [E8]. Thirty-four days and a formal handoff suggest Beijing is building an institution, not running a one-off demonstration [E1][E2]. Contested waters that once saw episodic probes may now carry standing Chinese coast-guard crews as a permanent fixture east of Taiwan [E2][E7].